Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency by Giovanni Battista Ramello




WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 




AGGREGATE LITIGATION AND REGULATORY INNOVATION: 












. Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation:  


















Abstract:  In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only 
restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in 
stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely 
to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by 
defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific 
economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a 
specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital 
needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 1961, Guido Calabresi's influential contribution, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the 
Law of Tort”, challenged the then-prevailing assumption that spreading losses was more efficient 
than concentrating them only because “the real burden of a loss is smaller the more people share it” 
(p. 517).  
Just a few  years later another seminal work, The Logic of Collective  Action by  Mancur Olson 
(1965),  provided  evidence  that  the  uncoordinated  action  of  individuals  can  sometimes  be  less 
efficient than coordinated action. Olson’s contribution then became a prominent explanation for the 
formation of groups and, by extension, the emergence of specific institutions whose purpose it is to 
make that coordination possible. 
Though the above two works were unrelated, they are the two pillars which explain the emergence 
of aggregate litigation in legal procedure, and the reasons why it can be a powerful device for 
promoting social welfare when other institutional arrangements seem to be ineffective
1. There are in 
fact many circumstances where torts systematically spread losses across multiple individuals, but 
which individual action through the courts seems ill-equipped to tackle. This has become a major 
spur for amending regulation: to provide an alternative that complements or fully replaces legal 
action, in serving the interests of a multitude of interested parties (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003).  
However,  there  are  various  cases  in  which  even  regulation  falls  short,  and  substantial  failures 
emerge with respect to minimising the social cost of accidents, but with much more far-reaching 
repercussions,  for  example  impacting  on  the  performance  of  the  economic  system  as  a  whole 
(Porrini & Ramello, 2011). 
The above two shortcomings have resulted in a systematic under-protection of victims in some 
jurisdictions, prompting national lawmakers to address the incompleteness of liability systems.  
Aggregate  litigation  offers  a  reasonable  solution  midway  between  individual  litigation  and 
regulation, by creating a mechanism for gathering dispersed victims and channelling them into a 
type of action where the various parties jointly seek to promote their individual interests and those 
of society at large. 
Though arguments can be made both in favour of and against aggregate litigation, multi-claimant 
disputes,  resolved  and  litigated  on  a  collective  basis,  thus  far  seem  to  be  the  most  efficient 
                                                 
1 The term “aggregate litigation” is used here to denote lawsuits that bundle together large numbers of similar claims 
(hundreds, thousands, or more) pursued in some collective manner, i.e. what it is sometimes termed “group litigation”. 
The most well-known such procedural device--though not the only one--is class action. For a discussion see Hensler 
(2001).   3 
institutional solution for protecting victims and society, to the point that some authors have even 
posited an “inevitability” of aggregate litigation (Erichson, 2005). 
The  aim  of  this  work  is  to  discuss  one  particular—often  overlooked--argument  in  favour  of 
aggregate  litigation,  as  way  in  which  liability  can  further  serve  society:    it  can  contribute 
significantly to regulatory innovation, by producing a set of outputs that, taken together, supply 
focal points and inputs to the regulatory rule-making process, which is in many cases fossilised by 
structural rigidity. In this respect, therefore, aggregate litigation can help avert future regulatory 
failures. It can thus be regarded as an alternative judicial market technology that transforms the 
lawsuit into a "regulation incubator"--a field experiment for ascertaining the necessity of change, 
and the ability of the proposed solutions to meet real-world needs, also thanks to the large number 
of plaintiffs who become a proxy for society.  
Viewed in this light, aggregate litigation also pursues the goal of dynamic efficiency, by providing 
incentives that foster innovation, similarly to what happens, for example, with intellectual property 
rights. 
The article is organised as follows: section 2 uses the asbestos saga as an example of how aggregate 
litigation  can  promote  regulatory  change,  while  section  3  further  examines  the  nature  and 
limitations of regulation and its rule-making process; section 4 considers the different relationships 
that  exist  between  regulation  and  litigation,  discussing  how  aggregate  litigation  can  become 
instrumental to regulatory innovation; section 5 sketches out the rationale of aggregate litigation, 
discussing how this procedural solution is becoming significant in the tort system, while section 6 
disentangles the workings of the reward system set up by aggregate litigation, to determine the 
conditions under which this solution is superior to the alternatives for fostering innovation (but also 
for protecting victims); finally, section 7 draws the conclusions. 
 
 
2.  A historical tale: the long and winding road of asbestos regulation 
 
The story of asbestos--with particular focus on the US—provides an interesting example of the role 
of aggregate litigation in imparting momentum to regulatory change. 
Archaeological digs in Scandinavia have shown that, as early as 5000 years ago, asbestos was being 
used  in  crockery  for  its  fire  resistance  properties.  Subsequent  history  evinces  an  almost  sacral 
respect for this ‘indestructible' (this is the meaning of the Greek word “asbestos”) mineral fibre and 
its widespread use in many cultures for a variety of purposes (e. g. fireproofing, insulation, etc.).  
However, almost from the earliest times, we find suspicions of a link between asbestos and health   4 
problems. The first-century geographer Strabo noted that workers exposed to asbestos experienced 
diseases,  while  Pliny  the  Elder  advised  against  purchasing  slaves  from  asbestos  mines  because 
"they die young" (Barbalace, 2004a).  
Still, nothing substantial happened in the centuries that followed to reduce asbestos use, which on 
the contrary saw a dramatic rise during the industrial revolution. Since then, and for much of the 
20
th  century,  asbestos  was  extensively  employed  for  building  ships,  water  pipes,  clothing,  hair 
dryers, children's toys, and many other consumer and construction products.  
During those years, use of asbestos continued even as more definitive proofs began to emerge that 
asbestos  exposure  caused  a  number  of  serious  diseases,  including  mesothelioma  (cancer  of  the 
pleural lining of the chest and abdomen), lung cancer,  gastrointestinal cancer  and asbestosis (a 
disease affecting the breathing capacity of the lungs, which can range from non-disabling to fatal).  
First of all, there was no shortage of market signals, if we consider that by 1918 life insurance 
companies started to charge higher premiums for asbestos workers.  
Scientific  evidence  also  began  to  abound  during  those  years:  in  1924,  Dr.  Cooke,  an  English 
pathologist, published a number of reports identifying asbestos as the cause of various diseases. 
These  prompted  a  public  investigation  and  calls  for  improved  regulation,  but  led  to  no  severe 
penalties for asbestos use (Barbalace, 2004a and 2004b). 
Almost at the same time, a number of lawsuits were filed by asbestos workers. The first known U.S. 
compensation claim for asbestos disease was in 1927, and during the 1930s many other individual 
actions  were filed.  
Notwithstanding all these developments, and the scientific recognition of the dangers of asbestos, 
regulatory agencies failed to take their cue and amend the system, while tort law on its own was 
unable to impart the momentum for serious change (White, 2004).  
During that period, some states set up workers’ compensation programs that paradoxically acted as 
a safe harbour for producers against subsequent liability. Apart from that, for a long time regulators 
were essentially asleep at the wheel, and asbestos use continued to increase unhindered in the US 
and many other countries over the decades. In spite of mounting evidence that asbestos exposure 
posed serious health risks, in the US--the pioneering nation for regulatory change--asbestos use 
continued  to  grow  up  until  the  early  1970s,  and  it  was  only  then  that  regulatory  agencies–the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and, 
later,  the  Consumer  Safety  Product  Commission—began  to  seriously  take  note  and  amend  the 
restrictions.  Increasingly  stringent  regulations  were  then  put  in  place  over  the  ensuing  years, 
culminating in the total ban proposed by the EPA in 1989. Though this ban was later overturned by   5 
a federal circuit court
2, allowing some products to still legally contain trace amounts of asbestos, by 
1990 overall asbestos use had become tightly controlled, and in most products it could no longer be 
used
3. 
Now, the main reason advanced to explain this regulatory shift is that the liability environment 
became less favourable to asbestos producers during the 1960s. This was due to various factors, 
including the transition of product liability law from a negligence rule to a strict liability rule, the 
mounting scientific evidence, and some changes to the legal technicalities of lawsuit claims, not the 
least of which was the newly introduced possibility of filing aggregate lawsuits–in general under 
Rule 42a, available since 1966–and the resultant awarding of compensation to victims (Hensler, 
2001; White, 2004).  
The  turning  point  occurred  in  1969,  with  the  compensation  paid  by  the  largest  U.S.  asbestos 
producer to 285 of its employees, who were able to access a consolidated litigation. After that, 
many  other aggregate litigations were filed that resulted in the victims receiving compensation 
(Carroll,  et  al.,  2005).This  seems  to  have  had  a  significant  effect  in  attracting  the  attention  of 
regulators and triggering regulatory change. The consequences extended beyond the borders of the 
US, with other countries implementing similar regulatory regimes in their own national systems. 
It is worth noting that this pattern of causal links between aggregate litigation and regulatory change 
has also occurred in other situations. For instance, a comparable sequence of events unfolded in the 
case of breasts implants, which “demonstrates how manufacturers control the flow of information 
and how [aggregate] litigation can provide information that stimulates regulation” (Hersch, 2002, 
pp. 143-144)
4. In this case, too, there was the recognition of a previous regulatory failure by the 
Food and Drug Administration, which was then put on the right track for correcting the regulations 
by the litigation and the information thereby disclosed.  
If we consider these two cases, certain similarities emerge that are relevant to the thesis under 
discussion: 
1.  Regulation can for a long time prove ineffective due to capture by producers, or simply due 
to the inertia of the pre-existing regulatory equilibrium. 
2.  Aggregate  litigation  can  act  as  a  trigger  for  regulatory  innovation:  whereas  separate 
individual  lawsuits  seem  unable  to  make  their  impact  felt  on  the  rule-making  process, 
                                                 
2 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
3 The described dynamic also had consequences in other countries, which at the turn of the century completely banned 
the use of asbestos; this naturally entailed further restrictions on US productions that were partly intended for export. 
4 An interesting observation is that, also in this case, there were individual litigations that awarded damages to the 
plaintiffs. However regulation only received a significant push with the launch of the first class action, in which over 
440,000 women took part (Hersch, 2002).   6 
aggregate litigation instead seems to attain a sort of minimum efficient scale in liability, able 
to elicit a reaction from regulators. 
3.  The outcome(s) of the legal action can then serve as the inputs for the ensuing regulatory 
change. 
 
To  summarise,  aggregation  is  a  litigation  technology  that,  as  well  as  possibly  permiting  more 
efficient vindication of claims regarding “a common question of law or fact”, also creates a proper 
set of incentives for fostering innovation in regulation. However this second effect, as we shall 
argue below, is strictly dependent on the existence of sufficient private incentives for undertaking 
the legal action. 
 
 
3.  Structural characteristics and limits of regulation 
 
Regulation is a centralised system, external to the market, which has the aim of pursuing socially 
beneficial objectives that often include, among others, efficiency. This function, paired with the 
desire to protect the "public interest", has led to the emergence of a "regulatory state", intended to 
correct real or presumed market failures for which a public solution seems called for. A typical case 
is  the  need  to  remedy  failures  arising  from  natural  monopolies,  but  also  those  connected  with 
various types of externalities and information asymmetries, which have the well-known effect of 
distorting the efficient allocation of resources.  
In  some  cases—relevant  also  to  the  discussion  that  follows—a  further  aim  of  regulation  is  to 
promote the production of public goods which the market is unable to produce on its own account.  
From a structural standpoint, the advent of regulation means that decisions and choices become 
centrally managed by government bodies, generally under a "command and control" type structure, 
thus depriving private parties of the unfettered initiative which they instead enjoy in the free market. 
Regulation thus has the added effect of shifting the sphere of competence from the private to the 
public realm (Gleiser and Shleifer, 2003). 
In effect, especially for questions of strong social import (such as financial crises or pollution), even 
though  there  is  theoretically  scope  for  individual  action,  regulation  is  regarded  as  the  most 
appropriate response for pursuing the collective interest, precisely because it relies upon a higher 
authority that is presumed to be super partes, and representative of the collective. This position, 
which  could  be  contested  from  a  strictly  economic  perspective,  is  explicitly  intended  to  focus 
emphasis  on  the  public  interest  (Rose-Ackerman,  1991;  Spulber,  1989).    Such  an  approach  is   7 
therefore  inherently  political,  since  it  tends  to  emphasise  the  pre-eminence  of  central  power  in 
solving a particular problem, and seeks to create consensus around a public decision. 
There is also the practical question of the technicalities involved in protecting certain individual or 
collective interests. As in other productive activities, these may call for specialist knowledge that 
"generalist" individuals or bodies such as governments are unable to command (Glaeser, Johnson & 
Shleifer,  2001).  The  creation  of  separate  institutions—generally  administrative  agencies—is 
intended precisely to favour the accumulation and concentration of specialist knowledge about the 
sectors being regulated, as routinely happens today in the case of financial markets, environmental 
pollution, telecommunications, drugs, and the like
5.  
Such a solution makes it possible to exploit the comparative advantage of specialist organisations in 
solving problems that require specific competencies, while at the same time enjoying informational 
and implementational economies of scale
6.  
Yet the “technical” response also inevitably causes a change in the distribution of power, since the 
described solution does not just have the effect of fostering development of technical know-how; it 
also delegates —albeit within a clearly delimited scope– part of the legislative and executive power 
to  the  agencies  themselves,  who  consequently  “make  rules,  and  adjudicate  them”,  significantly 
derogating from the separation of powers called for by the conventional democratic framework 
(Georgakopoulos, 2005, p. 40)
7.  
Such a situation may be problematic in that it alters the balance of power between legislators, who 
represent (or ought to represent) the collective interest, and the bureaucracies, which may receive 
incentives that conflict with the legislators' political mandate, causing them for example to pursue 
the direct interests of those who govern the agencies. This can have quite severe consequences on 
the rule-making process, and hence on regulatory innovation (Spulber, 1989). 
Though closer links between regulator and regulated sector can, on the one hand, make it easier to 
understand and tackle issues, they can also have two effects that amplify the above problem. First of 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 134) cite productive organisations– i. e. a relevant group of individuals 
such as a firm--but this can apply equally to regulatory agencies, which are institutions devoted among other things to 
embodying knowledge that is “not consciously known or articulable by anyone in particular”, yet effective and crucial 
for the activity.  
6 “The justification of administrative agencies rests on the development of specialized areas of knowledge that created a 
need for the administration of their regulation by specialists […] who are at the best position to administer an area of 
law that corresponds to new complex technological interactions (Georgakopoulos, 2005, p. 41) 
7 Similar criticisms have also been levelled against individual legal action which, according to some authors, “threatens 
democracy” because it replaces the will of the majority as expressed through elections with that of individual action or 
of the judiciary power (as expressed by H. Sterling Burnett of the National Center for Policy Analysis, as reviewed in 
Cook & Ludwig, 2002). Therefore, at least in this sense, the two systems elicit similar comments.   8 
all, there is the possibility of “regulatory capture”, and of various forms of collusion, as extensively 
discussed in the literature, may fossilise regulation and regulatory change (since Stigler, 1971)
8;  
Secondly, the narrower perspective of specialist agencies can impair their ability to take a wide-
ranging view of society, and especially to perceive when there is broad consensus among citizens as 
to new needs and regulatory choices. This, coupled with the bureaucratic character of administrative 
agencies, makes regulation unresponsive compared to the "sensitiveness" of the market, so that the 
rule-making process is invariably convoluted and slow moving. 
The above elements, taken together, provide a reasonable explanation for the regulatory failures 
which occurred in the cases of asbestos and breast implants. 
 
 
4.  Regulation and litigation: an evolving relationship 
 
The  discussion  thus  far  has  concerned  the  general  case  of  regulation  in  the  market,  but  seems 
equally appropriate for examining the relationship between regulation and tort law; the latter is in 
effect a sort of specialised market—operating through the court system--for protecting the interests 
of parties, and as such is likewise susceptible to what might be termed a judicial market failure 
(Cassone &  Ramello, 2011).  
In this case, the interplay between tort and regulation is important not just for determining the 
allocation  of  resources,  but  especially  for  promoting  the  production  of  certain  public  goods—
namely justice and deterrence--with a view to minimising the social cost of accidents (Calabresi, 
1970). 
The interaction between regulation and litigation has been a subject of ongoing debate, among both 
academics  and  public  policy-makers.  While  it  is  possible  to  assert  that  originally  “[…]  the 
regulation of markets was a response to dissatisfaction with litigation as a mechanism of social 
control of business” (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003, p. 401), in recent decades the law and economics 
debate has detected a comparable weakness in regulation, suggesting that there is a more complex 
relationship between these two systems, played out essentially on three levels. These are, depending 
on the perspective of analysis one adopts: 
 
·  A relationship of substitutability  
                                                 
8 The main idea is that in such cases a firm may inappropriately water down the regulations to obtain a private benefit–
such as a desired price regime–or to render them irrelevant, while the authority can increase its budget or its bribes. 
According to this view, a number of laws passed in the US can in reality be ascribed to strategies of market foreclosure, 
such as raising rivals’ costs (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003).   9 
·  A relationship of complementarity  
·  A relationship of causality 
 
The substitutability relationship corresponds to the conventional law and economics view that both 
regulation and litigation are systems devoted to remedying accidents, and hence to averting the 
erosion of social welfare arising out of negative externalities (Wittman, 1977).  
Accordingly, the central question dominating the literature is whether regulation or litigation should 
be endorsed for tackling market failures. Ex-ante, a perfectly informed regulatory authority should 
be able to set up an optimal incentive scheme that causes tortfeasors to adopt efficient levels of 
prevention. Ex-post, harmed individuals should always be able to protect their own interests and 
receive full and proper compensation, provided the liability system is complete (Calabresi, 1970; 
Shavell, 1987). Thus, in an ideal world, liability and regulation would be perfect substitutes for each 
other, so that either one could be used. 
However,  if  there  are  any  imperfections,  neither  system  may  be  able  to  produce  an  efficient 
outcome on its own account. In this case, a combination of regulation plus liability may be needed 
to give economic agents a full set of incentives, and achieve at least a second-best solution. In a 
seminal work, Shavell (1984a) examines the combined use of ex ante and ex post regulation as a 
means for controlling risk and solving the puzzle of how to produce a socially desirable level of 
prevention, suggesting four determinants for choosing which better applies in a given setting
9.  
Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) explicitly note that the liability system is systematically used to 
correct the shortcomings of imperfect regulation, arising from the difficulty of defining proper and 
complete ex ante standards. Thus, the coupling of regulation and tort law is necessary to ensure an 
optimal  level  of  prevention,  and  the  two  system  should  be  regarded  as  complementary  for 
minimising the cost of accidents.  
Other  authors  reach  a  similar  conclusion  by  analysing  the  susceptibility  of  both  tort  law  and 
regulation to capture by specific parties. This is one of the reasons that prompted the design of 
regulatory institutions to avert the danger of corruption of United States judges (Glaeser & Shleifer, 
2003), and similar arguments apply for the weakness of regulation vis-a-vis the regulated entities 
(Stigler, 1971; McChesney, 1987).  
In  summary,  the  prevailing  orientation,  in  a  wide  range  of  cases,  is  for  the  two  institutional 
technologies to be viewed as complementary for pursuing efficiency. This is borne out by empirical 
evidence from specific sectors, such as insurance (Helland & Klick, 2007). 
                                                 
9 Other authors argue in favour of either one or the other system also for contingent reasons, connected with the degree 
of exposure to subversion by potential violators (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003), or with other specific attributes (see for 
instance the somewhat antithetical opinions of Cane, 2002 and Hylton, 2002).   10 
4.1. Liability and regulatory change 
 
However there is also a third relationship between the two systems, which takes the form of a causal 
link  between  liability  and  regulation.  In  effect,  liability  produces  not  only  deterrence,  but  also 
positive externalities in the form of other public goods, such as information externalities for the 
parties  involved  in  the  litigation  and  for  consumers,  standardization  of  care,  development  of 
knowledge and, in the  case of  collective litigation, as we shall see below, also the creation of 
consensus (Burch, 2008; Arlen, 2010; Deffains & Langlais, 2011). Such effects concern society as a 
whole,  but  in  many  cases  also  furnish  inputs  which  regulation  can  use  to  regenerate  itself.  In 
particular,  information  externalities,  standardization  of  care  and  new  knowledge  serve  as  direct 
inputs to regulation, while the presence of consensus among a multitude of victims can act as a 
trigger  for  regulatory  change.  In  other  words,  aggregate  litigation  can  become  a  sort  of  R&D 
laboratory,  in  which  plaintiffs  act  as  a  proxy  for  society,  and  the  judicial  solution  serves  as  a 
prototype for regulatory change
10.  
An action representing a large number of individuals has the added advantage of giving a more 
robust signal of how well regulators' decisions are meeting the needs of the regulated subjects.  
The opposite route, of decisions taken unilaterally by regulators, can lead to glaring errors like the 
celebrated case of the Food and Drug Administration's ban on cyclamates and then saccharin, which 
the US Congress later reversed in favour of labelling and individual choice, following public outcry 
(Gruenspecht & Lave, 1989). 
The alternative, otherwise, is to embark on a wide-ranging consultation process that further slows 
down regulatory change; even then, identifying sharp social goals can prove quite difficult.  
Viewed in this light, aggregate litigation provides a sort of natural field experiment for regulation, 
“where the environment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the 
subjects do not know that they are participants in an experiment” (List, 2006, p. 8). As discussed in 
the experimental economics literature, the outcome of a field experiment gives policy makers a 
useful testing ground in which to observe, on a small scale, the consequences of their projected 
measures. Such a model has in fact already been applied in the law-making process, at least in the 
US where “much of what is introduced as “new” legislation at the top level of federalist systems is 
oftentimes experimented with at lower levels and found to be successful”. This is exemplified by 
the famous historical precedent of the New Deal:  President Roosevelt himself in fact affirmed that 
                                                 
10  Glaeser  &  Shleifer  (2003)  observe  an  interesting  correlation  between  the  evolution  of  tort  law  and  that  of  the 
railroads, which naturally preceded the development of regulation.   11 
“[p]ractically  all  the  things  we've  done  in  the  federal  government  are  the  things  Al  Smith  did 
[formerly] as governor of New York.” (List, 2006, p. 9). 
Collective  civil  action  has  the  further  benefit  of  more  forcefully  countering  the  skewing  of 
regulation  toward  interests  groups,  which  is  one  of  the  traditional  obstacles  to  regulatory 
innovation, and even a means for the regulated sector to extract rents (Friedman, 2000). 
In short, the amendment to civil procedure (which as we shall see offers the group of victims a 
productive framework that enables them to access economies of scale and transfer risk) not only 
promotes  efficiency  but  has  the  further,  no  less  important,  effect  of  creating  a  “countervailing 
power” to that of the stronger economic actors, thereby attenuating the classic problem in markets 
and  regulation  of  “inequality  of  weapons”,  i.e.  economic  inequality  among  parties  involved 
(Glaeser, Scheinkman & Shleifer, 2003).  
To  be  sure,  the  administrative  concentration  that  characterises  regulation  facilitates  political 
pressure  by  interest  groups,  who  find  themselves  well-placed  to  steer  ex-ante  bureaucratic  rule 
making,  naturally  to  the  detriment  of  efficiency,  the  proper  role  of  regulation,  and  the  fair 
representation of all social parties (Rose-Ackerman, 1995)
11.  
Finally, regulatory agencies are more subject to the rigidities—evocatively termed “ossification” 
(Burch, 2008)—arising from the political constraints and preferences of bureaucracies, and often 
also limited by procedural rules imposed by legislators to curb their discretionary power.  
Now, regulatory innovation, as a deviation from the status quo of a given political equilibrium, 
represents a risk for bureaucracies, which generally prefer to pursue practical results rather than 
take risks with innovations (McCubbins & Page, 1986). 
Tort law and aggregate litigation thus become a sort of “incubator” for regulation, collecting signals 
from the market and society in real time, raising awareness among administrative agencies and 
politicians, and imparting the momentum for regulatory change. This can even happen in cases 
where the plaintiff loses the lawsuit, if it still creates enough mobilization to bring about a change of 
the existing system (NeJaime, 2011). 
Regulatory change can take place through strictly judicial routes, especially in common law systems 
where rulings have a legislative effect—a mechanism that some have criticised as overstepping the 
bounds of normal legislative activity (Viscusi, 2002)--or more indirectly, i.e. by using the litigation, 
its outcome and other surrounding elements as signals for the rule-maker. 
Liability can thus continue to perform its function of protecting victims and producing deterrence, 
thereby pursuing static efficiency, but also becomes an instrument for pursuing dynamic efficiency, 
                                                 
11 Rose-Ackerman (1995) discusses how, in certain institutional settings, citizens can essentially be excluded from 
bureaucracies' regulatory amendments.   12 
to the extent that it fosters regulatory change, by a consolidated paradigm that stimulates production 
of an innovation, as we shall see below, through an ad hoc system of private incentives. 
It is interesting to observe that, at least in the case of class action, this role seems to be tacitly 
recognised.  In effect, the divide between its supporters and detractors disappears when it comes to 
acknowledging  class  action's  contribution  to  public  policy,  both  directly  by  filling  the  gaps  in 
administrative regulation, and indirectly by promoting optimal regulation design (Helland & Klick, 
2007). A similar influence can be observed in the case of securities class actions, and their effects 
on the regulation of financial markets (Burch, 2008). 
 
 
5.  The nature of aggregate litigation  
 
The causal relation between litigation and regulatory rule-making relies on special conditions that 
make it possible to promote social welfare by allowing an innovator to partially appropriate the 
social value of the regulatory innovation. However such a dynamic does not emerge spontaneously, 
but requires solving the organisational puzzle of reconciling enforcement of the dispersed victims' 
rights, the private interests of one or more attorneys—henceforth termed the plaintiffs' counsel or 
simply the attorney—and the social interest of producing the public goods of deterrence and, of 
course, regulatory change.  
In general, whenever there are high transaction costs, excessive fragmentation of rights, lack of 
coordination  or  significant  asymmetries  between  parties,  such  that  there  is  underutilisation  of 
individual  rights,  pooling  those  rights  together  may  represent  the  more  efficient  solution.  This 
happens not so much by eliminating the pre-existing rights, which would constitute an infringement 
of  those  rights  and  so  also  reduce  their  value  in  economic  terms,  but  by  creating  economic 
institutions capable of drawing together such rights and managing them collectively, in the manner 
predicted by Olson (1965). Within the domain of property, for example, Heller and Eisebenberg 
(1998, p. 700) assert that “[when] the background legal rules threaten to waste resources, people 
often rearrange rights sensibly and create order through private arrangements”.  
The mechanism of aggregate litigation follows the same rationale, and thus works by reorganising 
victims into a litigation, bound by  the rules of civil procedure, in order to more efficiently exercise 
certain specific rights.  
Albeit with some resistance, especially in civil law systems, various jurisdictions have in recent 
years been pressed to institute solutions that can facilitate or make practicable collective redress. 
The European Community, for  example, is currently under siege and has embarked on a wide   13 
ranging consultation for introducing this instrument within its member states
12. This takes its cue 
from local initiatives that have from time to time sought to create sui generis aggregate litigations, 
either by using the criminal process, or simply  by forum-shopping for jurisdictions that permit 
aggregate litigations, as in the cases of Parmalat or Lufthansa Cargo Airline, where the victims, 
respectively in Italy and Germany, tried with varying degrees of success to access the US class 
action system (Porrini & Ramello, 2011)
13. In similar vein, many European financial institutions 
acted  as  lead  plaintiffs  in  a  number  of  US  securities  class  actions  litigated  under  the  Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, whereas they could not even have filed such a lawsuit in Europe 
(Gelderman, 2006). These examples, even if fragmentary, confirm that in some jurisdiction there 
are  significant  gaps  in  victims'  protection--a  situation  that  also  has  repercussions  on  regulatory 
innovation.  
The twofold failure of individual litigation and regulation is essentially explained by the fact that 
neither institution is able to produce the appropriate incentives for obtaining an efficient result. In 
other words, these two production "technologies" are unfitted for the context in which they operate, 
so  that  the  solution  must  go  by  some  alternative  route.  Whereas  regulation  suffers  from  the 
previously described structural rigidity, which cannot be radically eliminated, the judicial market 
offers scope for alternative solutions which, by shifting the boundaries of litigation, may attain a 
more  satisfactory  "productive"  configuration  than  that  of  individual  action.  The  argument  here 
mirrors that used for explaining the emergence of hierarchies when there is a need to internalise 
externalities, for example in the well-known problem in economics of indivisibility in production, 
which arises in the case of economies of scale (or scope), and makes it impossible to rely on the 
competitive market for optimal allocation of resources (Edwards and Starr 1984).  
Indivisibility plays a prominent part in the understanding of industrial organisations, and of course 
likewise  affects  the  market  structure.    In  consequence,  the  different  organisations  and  multiple 
forms of enterprises in the market, and of aggregate ventures in the judicial market, should be 
regarded  as  institutional  solutions  designed  to  achieve  adequate  productive  configurations  for 
specific contexts. Naturally, the possible divergence between the interests of individuals and those 
of the newly created group raises issues in aggregate litigation that mirror those studied in firm 
theory, such as the conflict of interest between owners and managers
14. The solution, in both cases, 
lies  in  creating  a  set  of  incentives  that  produces  a  convergence  of  interests;  in  general,  this  is 
                                                 
12 Ref. “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress”, SEC(2011)173 Final, February 4, 20 
13 Italy and Germany, in response to these pressures, have recently introduced particular forms of aggregate litigations 
which are, however, much more severely constrained by procedural restrictions than in America (Henseler, 2011). 
14 The problem of finding the optimal incentive also applies to the relationship between an individual plaintiff and 
attorney (see Halpern & Turnbull, 1983 and for a more recent discussion Sacconi, 2011).   14 
achieved by entitling the agent to appropriate a share of the expected benefits, a situation which 
grants a de facto property right over a portion of the proceeds of the productive activity to the party 
that is best able to promote efficiency. In the case of liability, this is often the plaintiff's counsel. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  creation  of  a  hierarchy  defines  an  exclusive  right  over  the  specific 
productive activity. Such a right, in the judicial market, corresponds to a specific legal action, and 
thus in practice means creating a local monopoly on a particular litigation. This aspect is by no 
means peripheral to the incentive system in the case of collective redress: it is a prerequisite for 
being able to assign a property right over the potential rewards of the legal action. Such a right, in 
its  turn,  becomes  the  central  element  (i.e.  the  price)  for  achieving  transfer  of  risk  through  a 
contingent fee reward scheme. The party financing the legal action – often the attorney – thus 
obtains the right to extract a portion of the awarded proceeds as a remuneration for the risk
15.  
The currently available reference models for aggregate litigation are those of the US legal system, 
whose Rule 20, Rule 23 and Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Section  1407 of 
Title 28 of the United States Code, taken together, introduce various ways of pursuing aggregate 
litigation  in  the  form  of  class  action,  multi-district  litigation,  formal  consolidation  and  other 
solutions, thereby redrawing the boundaries of litigation. 
Rule 23 is the most well-known, in that it introduces class action, which has the role of exhausting 
in  a  single  litigation  all  possible  claims  of  a  predefined  population  of  victims
16.  Among  the 
technicalities of class action, there is also the indirect representation of victims who are unable to 
join the legal action on their own account (so-called absent parties). The other solutions, in a more 
fragmentary way, promote collective or coordinated legal actions which for example "involve a 
common question of law or fact [and in which] the court may:  (1) join for hearing or trial any or all 
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid 
unnecessary cost or delay” (Rule 42a, 2009 edition).  
While the specific technical features of each procedural solution are discussed elsewhere (Hensler, 
2001  &  2011;  Calabresi  &  Schwartz,  2011),  in  all  cases  one  of  the  key  criteria  for  choosing 
between  them  is  efficiency--meaning  the  extent  to  which  the  aggregation  is  able  to  pursue 
expedition and economy. 
Hence the different forms of aggregation can be compared to the different types of business entities 
(e. g. public company, joint venture, etc.), whose function it is to best exploit the advantages of the 
hierarchy in different situations. Under this analogy, in the productive organisation of the judicial 
                                                 
15 Naturally this can be a single attorney, a law firm, or a consortium of attorneys. The current debate is even examining 
the possibility of finding ad hoc financial solutions, for example using third parties to finance the aggregate litigation, as 
happens in many productive activities; this is even more important in jurisdictions where  fee-shifting is required, thus 
making it necessary to take out an insurance policy or security bond against potential adverse costs  (Hensler, 2011).  
16 For a more detailed discussion of class action see for example Calabresi & Schwartwz (2011).   15 
market, class action lies at one extreme, since it exhausts in a single litigation the claims of a broad 
population of victims who become shareholders in the legal action (essentially a sort of public 
company). The other solutions occupy intermediate positions, making it possible to exploit some 
benefits  of  aggregate  litigation  even  in  situations  where  all  the  victims  cannot  join  in  a  single 




6.  Regulatory innovation through litigation:  how it works 
 
The various forms of aggregate litigation have distinct procedural features which differentiate them 
from each other. However they  all share the  common feature of being organisational solutions 
designed  to  remedy  the  market  failures  of  individual  action,  that  arise  essentially  out  of  cost 
asymmetries (litigation cost  or opportunity cost of filing the lawsuit), informational asymmetries 
(the victim knows less than the tortfeasor) and risk management asymmetries (if the tortfeasor is a 
corporation, it is better able to manage the risks associated with the litigation than the individual 
claimants) between the plaintiffs and the defendant. 
As previously argued, the extreme case is that of class action, where aggregation makes it possible 
to vindicate claims that would otherwise never be litigated. In other cases, collective lawsuits are 
aimed more at promoting efficiency in the judicial market, on the side of both the plaintiffs and 
court. In other words, aggregate litigations make it possible to pursue “judicial economy” (Berstein, 
1977),  favouring  the  emergence  of  economies  of  scale  in  litigation  and  efficiency  in  general, 
avoiding the problem of different courts handing down conflicting decisions (which then have to be 
resolved), and consolidating the role of victims who thus face lower costs and are better placed to 
take part in the action. 
Aggregation by itself is, however, only one of the elements that make this new organisational form 
of litigation  effective; the other pillar supporting the system is the contingent fee reward scheme, 
by which the risk is transferred to the party best able to manage it—generally an attorney or group 
of attorneys in the US (or sometimes an ad hoc financial venture, as in the Netherlands; Hensler, 
2011) in exchange for a property right over a share of the expected proceeds of the litigation. 
This view implies that the organisation of aggregate litigation must be complemented by a specific 
market for risk, so as to allocate the risk to the party best able to manage it. Such a solution is 
                                                 
17  This  is  precisely  what  happened  in  some  asbestos  cases,  where  two  proposed  class  action  settlements  were 
invalidated by the US Supreme Court (Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591, 1997, and Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp. 527 U.S. 815, 1999). 
   16 
comparable to what generally happens in business firms, and aggregate litigations can also become 
a means for gathering venture capital, if there is a suitable governance system that can provide 
sufficient and aligned incentives for "shareholders and management".  
The contingent fee reward scheme thus becomes comparable to a stock option issued to a financing 
party, designed to align the interests of the attorney and plaintiff while at the same time providing 




6.1. The economics of regulatory innovation through aggregate litigation 
 
The mechanism which governs aggregate litigation thus rests on a reward scheme common to many 
economic  settings,  including  that  of  innovation.  Such  a  scenario  can  be  formally  described  as 
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) (n TC are  the  litigation  costs,  which  depend  on  the  number  of  plaintiffs  n,  the  attorney's 
opportunity cost  c for the defence of each client, and the fixed costs  L that represent the costs of 
operating in the judicial market, which for example may include accessory costs that are however 
necessary for the action, such as expert surveys or other technicalities specific to the lawsuit
18. 
Therefore, when the action becomes collective or consolidated, such costs are borne jointly and thus 
make it possible to attain economies of scale for the plaintiffs
19.  
For ease of analysis, let us set the value  0 = c . 
1 0 < < p   is  the  probability  of  winning  the  litigation,  andDare  the  proceeds  arising  from  the 
litigation (damages awarded by the jury or settlements); let us hypothesise that these are defined in 
a way that satisfies the criterion of full internalisation of the harm, i.e. such as to minimise the 
                                                 
18 Stylization provides a compact way to capture the effects of the economies of scale produced by aggregation, and 
which can concern not just fixed costs but also other variables, such as the timescale of the proceeding, whose duration 
for the group of the victims is less than sum of the durations of the individual proceedings (White, 2006). 
The  literature  concurs  that,  irrespective  of  the  chosen  form  of  aggregate  litigation,  expert  witnesses,  factual 
investigation and other technicalities specific to the procedure can create economies of scale (Erichson, 2005). 
19 The representation does not alter in the case of multiple attorneys. For example, if there are 2 attorneys  the costs will 
be  c n c n L 2 1 + + , where  2 1 n n ¹  are two different groups of victims.   17 
social cost of accidents (Calabresi, 1970). The overall outcome of the system will thus be to transfer 
this cost onto the tortfeasor, thereby promoting deterrence and regulatory innovation.  
Let us further assume risk-neutral individuals. The expected litigation profit of the entire group of 
litigants n is then described by the following Bernoulli equation:  
 
L pD n E A - = ) ( p     (1) 
 
The lawsuit will be filed by the victims if the expected net profit is non-negative, that is:  
 
p L D / ³     (2) 
 
In other words, the damages awarded must be greater than the litigation costs for any value of p . 
Now let us further assume that there are indivisibilities in production, so that the proceeds in the 
case of individual litigation are equal to  Z  such that  nZ D > , and that this value is less than that 
required for the full internalisation of accidents. Then there might be a case for failure of individual 
litigation. 
Each of the n would-be litigants would then face an expected profit  L pZ E n - = ) 1 ( p , and either of 
the following situations might occur,  L pZ ³  or  L pZ < .  Let us also assume for now that the 
individual litigations are statistically independent, and that the judiciary is an efficient technology, 
so that the outcome of comparable cases will always be the same. 
In the case  L pZ < , no individual litigation will be undertaken, and indeed aggregate litigation 
becomes the only way for protecting non-vindicated claims
20.  
Where  L pZ ³  holds, a sum of  n lawsuits will be filed and the expected profit of the litigation 
“industry” will then be:  
) ( ) ( L pZ n n E n - = p     (3) 
 
We can see that the aggregate litigation can still be the more efficient organisational arrangement 
for vindicating claims and producing public goods such as deterrence and regulatory innovation. 
In point of fact, aggregate litigation becomes inefficient only when the following condition is 
satisfied  ) ( ) ( n E n E A n p p ³ . Now, by substituting and solving it easy to see that this corresponds to 
the following condition :  
                                                 
20 In this case specific systems are needed to convert negative expected value litigations into profitable ventures. Class 
action is able to achieve this effect (Cassone & Ramello, 2011), or other mechanisms can be envisaged (De Mot & 
Depoorter, 2010).   18 
 
p L n D nZ / ) 1 ( - - ³    (4) 
which is true only when  1 = n  and there are no indivisibilities, so that the outcomes of aggregate 
and  individual  litigations  coincide.  Otherwise,  when  1 > n   aggregate  litigation  is  always  more 
efficient since condition (4) cannot hold. 
Until now, we have however hypothesised a competitive market in which litigation for the plaintiff 
is essentially cost based, and all the expected benefit goes to compensate the victims. 
Let us now extend the scenario by positing that aggregate action requires a specific system of 
incentives, to motivate  an individual to take on the burden of pursuing or promoting the legal 
action. The machinery of aggregate litigation, in its various forms, in fact calls for the efforts of an 
actor—or group of actors--with the capability and motivation to finance and manage the complex 
endeavour of producing justice. Such an actor can be likened to an entrepreneur who bears non-
insurable risks and introduces innovations in exchange for opportunities to profit. These profits 
remunerate the factors of production and compensate for the risk. 
As we have said, this "lead" actor is generally an attorney or a law firm that takes on the risk in 
exchange for the right to appropriate a shareq  of the expected profits. This appropriation requires 
creating  a  legal  monopoly  over  a  specific  litigation,  to  make  the  expected  private  benefit  high 
enough to provide a sufficient incentive whilst also stimulating production of public goods. The 
described situation mirrors an institutional mechanism widely used in intellectual property, where 
the (temporary) legal monopoly assigned via patent over a knowledge item produces a level of 
appropriability that is lower than the social value of the invention, and hence an expected reward 
sufficient  to  motivate  the  inventor  to  produce  new  knowledge
21.  Therefore,  q   measures  the 
property  right  over  the  expected  proceeds,  assigned  to  the  party  who  promotes,  finances  and 
manages the litigation, referred to here for conciseness as the attorney. 
The expected profit for the entrepreneurial attorney of the aggregate action will thus be:  
 
L pD n E A - = ) ( ) ( q p    (5) 
 
which therefore implies the condition  p L D / ³ q . Given that condition (2) applies, the value of the 
appropriation must be  1 0 < <q , and this means the expected benefits must strictly  exceed the 
litigation costs for the attorney to also receive a sufficient reward, and that the compensation of the 
                                                 
21 In the case under study, the social value is greater than D since it also includes the positive externalities discussed 
previously. For a short discussion of the incentives for innovation see e. g. Ramello (2005).   19 
victims will never be complete. Accordingly (2) becomes  p L D / >  which is also the profitability 
condition which discourages filing of lawsuits that do not meet this criterion.  
Moreover, if we rewrite the preceding inequality as 
p D
L 1
³ q , it is clear that that with decreasing 
probability of success of the legal action, the property rights have to increase. This reveals the direct 
relation with remuneration of the risk. 
 
 
6.2. Aggregate vs test plus litigation 
 
An alternative litigation solution consists in undertaking a test trial which produces a precedent, and 
for  the  other  victims  to  be  compensated  according  to  its  outcome  (henceforth  test  plus).  The 
simplified scenario sees an attorney filing suit with a payoff described by  L pZ E T A - = ) ( ) 1 ( q p  
(i.e. the appropriability is limited only to the test case) while the other  1 - n  victims, at no cost, fill 
out an administrative form (or pay only the opportunity cost of the attorney, here taken to be  0 = c ) 
to have the right to the individual proceeds in case of success, i.e.  pZ E n = - ) 1 ( 1 p for any other  1 - n  
plaintiffs. 
In this case the participation constraint becomes  p L Z T / ³ q  where  T q  measures the property right 
restricted to the test case.  
The fixed cost of litigating will be the same as for aggregate litigation, thus avoiding duplication of 
costs,  but  the  industry  profit  will  be  lower  than  in  the  case  of  aggregate  litigation  because  of 
indivisibilities. This can be easily seen by comparing the aggregate profit of the industry in both the 
case of equation (1) for aggregate litigation and: 
L npZ n E T - = ) ( p     (6) 
 
for test plus joint complaints. Setting (1) equal to (6), the test plus method will be better only under 
the condition  n D Z / > , which violates the indivisibility hypothesis. Moreover, if the incentive for 
the attorney is a decisive element for the legal action, this requires a higher share of appropriation, 






    (7) 
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even in the case where there are no economies of scale, and the right hand side is equal to  n . It 
follows that the value of Z  might anyway not be high enough to supply an adequate incentive.  
This means that, in line with the insight of Calabresi (1961), producing an effective countervailing 
power to spreading losses calls for a parallel spreading of costs. This argument is also relevant to 
discussing the role of legal monopoly over a class of litigations, i.e. “civil actions involving one or 
more common questions” (28 U. S. C. § 1407), since it is consistent with the need to produce 
adequate incentives. In fact, this line of reasoning represents the rationale for giving a single party a 
legal monopoly over a litigation category, since without this regulatory solution it is likely that no 
individual will have a sufficient incentive to sustain the test litigation costs.  
It is interesting to note that some jurisdictions have adopted systems similar to test plus, and have 
consequently had to devise formulas capable of promoting and financing the test case. One example 
is the Capital Markets Model Case Act (know as the ‘‘KapMuG’’), enacted in Germany in 2005, 
and designed to enhance investor protection through a system of test trials and linked actions. In 
order to solve the free-riding problem, it strictly regulates the manner in which the test-case and 
follow-on cases are related to each other (Hilgard & Kraayvanger, 2007). 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The  current  failure  of  individual  civil  action  and  regulation  in  certain  jurisdictions  has  called 
attention to alternative systems for protecting victims' rights and producing deterrence of harmful 
behaviour. 
One practicable solution to this two-fold failure is aggregate litigation, which offers an array of 
organisational solutions designed to reinstate the functionality of the tort system. This suggests that 
the judicial market is comparable to any other productive activity, and that organisation can offer a 
solution to the problem of collective action also in the case of litigation. There is in fact no special 
reason why a ‘one size fits all’ solution, which can never be found in most human and economic 
activities, should instead exist in the case of liability. 
After  all,  the  court  system  does  not  merely  administer  “justice”  but  also  produces  goods  and 
allocates  rights,  and  from  this  perspective  aggregate  litigation  can  be  seen  as  an  alternative 
organisational solution better able to promote efficiency when other institutions fail to do so.  
In  this  article,  we  have  argued  that  aggregate  litigation  can  not  only  restore  the  production  of 
victims’  compensation  and  deterrence,  but  also  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  stimulating  regulatory 
innovation.  This  is  accomplished  through  a  reward  system  that  seems  largely  to  mimic  the   21 
institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper 
set of incentives. These incentives then make it possible to pursue the additional goal of dynamic 
efficiency. 
The described system relies on creating a specific economic framework, able to foster economies of 
scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, 
who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces useful inputs 
for amending regulations. 
In this light, aggregate litigation thus serves as an incubator for regulation, making it possible to 
comprehensively surmount the traditional rigidities that hamper administrative agencies, thereby 
facilitating regulatory change. 
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